





[Forthcoming in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research] 
 
 
Many questions about wellbeing involve metaphysical dependence. Does wellbeing 
depend on minds? Is wellbeing determined by distinct sorts of things? Is it determined 
differently for different subjects? However, we should distinguish two axes of 
dependence. First, there are the grounds that generate value. Second, there are the 
connections between the grounds and value which make it so that those grounds 
generate that value. Given these distinct axes of dependence, there are distinct 
dimensions to questions about the dependence of wellbeing. In this paper, I offer a view 
of wellbeing that gives different answers with respect to these different dimensions. The 
view is subjectivist about connections but objectivist about grounds. Pluralist about 
grounds but monist about connections. Invariabilist about connections but variabilist 





Wellbeing is not some ethereal balm that we rub over our skin to improve our lives. Instead, 
personal value depends on there being something that is good or bad for someone. A central task for a 
theory of wellbeing is to uncover not only on what it depends but also how it depends. 
As for what, personal value is grounded in non-normative goings on. If pleasure is a basic 
good, then pleasure grounds positive wellbeing for the person who feels it. If having desires thwarted 
is a basic bad, then a frustrated desire grounds negative wellbeing for the frustrated person. If 
knowledge is a basic good, then someone knowing something grounds improvement in their life. 
 
* For their feedback, I thank Jonathan Schaffer, Gideon Rosen, and Larry Temkin. I also thank two anonymous 
reviewers for this journal. 
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This conception of value as being grounded shapes many of the debates over the nature of 
wellbeing. Take just three. Subjectivism versus objectivism is thought to turn on whether the grounds 
of personal value must include valuing attitudes. Pluralism versus monism is taken to be a dispute 
over the number of different sorts of grounds for value. And variabilism versus invariabilism is treated 
as the debate over whether value has the same grounds for all subjects.1  
However, if we consider only just the what we neglect the how. For we can ask not only what 
are the grounds of value for someone, but also what makes it the case that those grounds generate value 
for them. If a feeling being pleasurable grounds that feeling being good for a person, then we can ask 
why pleasure grounds good for them. If a person’s frustrated desire grounds that frustration being bad 
for them, then we can ask how it is that desire frustration generates badness. If knowledge is good for 
someone, then we can ask why knowing something produces positive value. Thus, the dependence of 
value on certain grounds itself depends on connections linking those grounds of value to the value 
that’s grounded. A theory of wellbeing should not only disclose the grounds of value, but also disclose 
the connections between the grounds of value and value.  
In this paper, I offer just such a theory. Using the distinction between connecting and 
grounding (§1), I offer a view that takes different sides of disputes with respect to grounding than with 
respect to connecting. Thus, I offer a view that is subjectivist about connecting but objectivist about 
grounding (§2). While the view is thus subjectivist overall, it captures some of the appearances 
motivating objectivism. I then show that this subjectivism about connections is invariabilist about 
connections but variabilist about grounds (§3). Such an approach captures the theoretical unity of 
 
1 While explicit discussion of this last issue is relatively recent, it’s a counterpart of traditionally important ethical issues 
revolving around universalizability, such as whether or not the same moral norms apply to all sentient beings.  
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invariabilism, while accommodating variabilism’s insights about the diversity of wellbeing across 
subjects. I next turn to showing that the view is pluralist about grounds but monist about connections 
(§4). Thus, it has the theoretical simplicity of traditional monist views, while allowing for complexity 
of value for a given subject. The view therefore encompasses the truths contained within traditionally 
opposing positions.  
I have two main aims in this paper. First, to use the grounding versus connecting distinction 
to reveal mutually independent dimensions of subjectivism versus objectivism, variabilism and 
invariabilism, and pluralism versus monism – where these dimensions induce a taxonomy of views 
about the structure of wellbeing. Second, to defend a specific view within this taxonomy that makes 
different choices with respect to each dimension. One can endorse the utility of the taxonomy, while 
rejecting the substantive view I defend – though one should, of course, accept both without hesitation. 
 
 
1. Grounding versus Connecting 
 
 Much of the discussion over the structure of wellbeing has involved – at least implicitly – the 
notion of metaphysical grounding. Grounding is a form of non-causal metaphysical dependence, 
whereby what’s grounded holds in virtue of its grounds (Fine 2012; Rosen 2010; Schaffer 2009).2 
 
2 Techie note: I remain neutral on fact grounding (Rosen 2010; Audi 2012), sentential grounding (Fine 2012; Dasgupta 
2014; Litland 2017), and entity grounding (Schaffer 2009; Bennett 2017). I’ll sometimes use variable letters to pick out the 
‘relata’ of grounding, whatever they may be. And I’ll sometimes speak of grounding ‘facts’ that enter in as the ‘relata’ of the 
grounding relation, but a sentential grounding person can easily reformulate these claims with reifying facts. As a final 
clarification, throughout I invoke full grounding. 
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Personal value itself cannot obtain independently of what has value for someone. Thus, value is 
grounded in the aspects of reality that produce it. 
 From here on, let ‘value’ pick out personal value. Then, in terms of grounding, the standard 
understanding of the debate over subjectivism and objectivism is that subjectivism holds that value is 
always grounded in some valuing attitude, whereas objectivism denies this. In this vein, L.W. Sumner 
(1995) holds that:  
 
A subjective theory will map the polarity of welfare onto the polarity of attitudes, so that being 
well-off will depend (in some way or other) on having a favorable attitude toward one’s life (or 
some of its ingredients), while being badly off will require being unfavorably disposed toward 
it. (767)  
 
Objectivist theories, according to Sumner, deny this dependence (see also Shafer-Landau 2003: 15; 
Sobel 2001, 2019: 146-148). On this conception, desire-satisfactionism is a paradigmatic subjectivist 
view, because value is grounded in attitudes of satisfied or thwarted desires. And the ‘objective list’ 
theory is appropriately named, because it includes grounds of value, such as knowledge, that don’t 
involve valuing attitudes. 
 As for pluralism and monism, the usual understanding is that pluralism holds that there are a 
variety of different sorts of grounds for value, whereas monism holds that there is just one. As Eden 




….a basic good (bad) is just a kind of positive (negative) welfare atom, so the dispute between 
monism and pluralism concerns how many kinds of positive and negative atoms there are… A 
kind K is a kind of welfare atom if and only if all of its members are atoms (i.e., are basically 
good or bad for you) because they are Ks.” (129; see also Lin 2015) 
 
This ‘because’ claim signals grounding. Thus, desire-satisfactionism and hedonism are paradigmatic 
monist theories, because on each of these views there is only one sort of basic good and bad. By contrast, 
objective list views that include more than one item are paradigmatically pluralist.3  
 Turning to variabilism and invariabilism, though it’s not often explicitly discussed, the 
common conception – if any conception about the issue can be called ‘common’ – revolves around 
grounding. As Lin (2018) characterizes the debate,  
 
Invariabilism implies that the same kinds are basically good or bad for all welfare subjects – that is, 
that the same list of basic goods and bads applies to them… By contrast, variabilism implies…that 
no list of basic goods and bads applies to all subjects. (323)4 
 
On this construal, variabilism is the view that different sorts of welfare subjects have different sorts of 
basic goods and bads, and invariabilism is the view that all welfare subjects have the same sorts of basic 
 
3 As Lin (2016) points out, most subjectivist views – in what I’ve been treating as the grounding sense – are monistic – in 
what I’ve been treating as the grounding sense. He argues that the best sort of subjectivist view is pluralist – in what I’ve 
been treating as the grounding sense. The subjectivist view – in the connection sense – I argue for will be pluralist – in the 
grounding sense. 
4 Lin further characterizes invariabilism as holding that the degree of value received from a basic value good or bad is 
calculated in the same way for different subjects, where variabilism denies this. We can set this wrinkle aside in what 
follows, because the view I propose will offer a hybrid conception in terms of the number of basic goods and bads. 
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goods and bads. So variabilism holds that personal value is grounded in different sorts of things for 
different sorts of subjects, whereas invariabilism denies this.  
As we’ve seen, the notion of grounding is used to characterize many of the central issues about 
the structure of wellbeing. But the relation between ground and grounded is not the only sort of 
dependence relation. Consider that many facts about what grounds what are themselves metaphysically 
dependent. Hence, there is a sort of metaphysical dependence that involves what underwrites 
grounding facts (Frugé 2021). Nothing important in this paper turns on the detailed nature of this 
dependency relation beyond that it puts in place grounding facts, though, for simplicity and specificity, 
throughout the paper I treat it as just more grounding.  
 
To grasp the distinction between grounds and connections, start with a visual analogy. A fifth-
grader glues pictures of the sun and a plant onto a science fair poster, and then glues an arrow between 
them. The arrow only points between the sun and the plant given that the glue holds all of them to the 
poster. The ‘dependency’ of the arrow between the sun and plant depends on the glue holding all of 
them together. Or, for further analogies, consider the dependence structure of logic and causation. As 
for logic, we can infer one proposition from another using an inference rule. For example, from (P→Q) 
and P we can infer Q using modus ponens. Thus, the appropriateness of the inference depends on the 
rule of logic. As for the causal case, causation is mediated by laws of nature. A law of nature that 
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negatively charged things repel one another mediates that two electrons being nearby cause each other 
to repel. Thus, the causation depends on the law.  
For an actual grounding example, it’s plausible to think that a statue is grounded in shaped 
clay, where that grounding fact is itself grounded in the intention of sculptor to make the clay into a 
statue. For another example, take the fact that a building is over six-stories tall grounds it being illegal, 
where this grounding itself depends on the law in the jurisdiction that buildings can’t be more than 
five-stories (Rosen 2017: 285-286).5 As a final example, take the fact that Congress passed a bill that 
declares murder is illegal, where this grounding itself depends on our socially accepting that Congress 
has legal authority (Epstein 2015: ch. 6).6   
Thus, elements grounded in a grounding fact depend on there being a ground of those 
grounding facts. When a grounds b such that this grounding fact is itself grounded in c, then the 
grounded element b depends on c. We can call this connection-dependence: 
 
Connection-Dependence: Necessarily, b connection-depends on c if and only if c grounds that 
a grounds b for some a.7 
 
5 Though Gideon Rosen treats the law as a further ground, I find it more plausible to treat it as a ground of the grounding 
fact of the illegality of the building. 
6 Though Brian Epstein treats the intention as an ‘anchor’ – I think it’s best to do away with anchoring in favor of 
grounding of grounding facts. 
7 Another techie note: The sort of grounding connection between a and b when a grounds b that I’m targeting is one that 
needn’t hold just when a obtains, and hence the connection c grounds that a grounds b even when a doesn’t obtain. To 
glance ahead, I hold that a valuing attitude serves as connection – say that valuing friendship makes it so that friendship 
grounds an improvement in wellbeing. But this valuing attitude sets in place the link between friendship and wellbeing, 
even without the subject being friends with anyone. It’s still the case that friendship, due to the valuing attitude, is the right 
sort of thing to improve the quality of the person’s life, regardless of whether they actually have friends. 
One way to handle this is to hold these links concern possible grounding, so that c connects that a grounds b just 
in case were c and a both the case, then b would obtain and would obtain in virtue of a and all of that would obtain in 
virtue of c. But I take it that there is an actual link created by a connection, even when the grounds in the grounding fact 




This is a legitimate sense of dependence. But it is not a dependence of the grounded element on its 
grounds. Rather, it’s a dependence of the grounded element on the grounds of its being grounded. 
When b is grounded in a, b arises from a precisely because a grounds b. It’s not just a but also the ‘glue’ 
between a and b – the metaphysical ‘staple’ that pins a to b. Thus, b owes its reality as much to a as to 
the generation itself from a. And in the case where c grounds that a grounds b, then that generation is 
itself generated from c. Thus, b connection-depends on c, and c is the connection between a and b.8 
 Accordingly, we can distinguish between the grounding-dependence and connection-
dependence of value. Something being good for someone grounding-depends on its grounds, but 
connection-depends on whatever makes it so that those grounds generate value. If hedonism is true, 
then pleasure grounds goodness, but that doesn’t settle what makes it the case that pleasure grounds 
goodness. If desire-satisfactionism is true, then frustrated desires ground badness, but that leaves it 
open what connects frustrated desires to the badness of that frustration. If the objective list theory is 
true, then acquiring items on the list is valuable, but that leaves open what connects those members of 
 
Hence, I think we need something closer to non-factive grounding, which is grounding that can obtain in the absence of 
the grounds actually obtaining (Fine 2012).  
8 Still another techie note: These connections needn’t be anything like metaphysical principles or laws. Indeed, I argue 
below that when it comes to wellbeing they are particular valuing attitudes. For example, a particular attitude of valuing 
friendship serves as connection in the generation of the fact that friendship grounds value for this person. Yet, this attitude 
isn’t a metaphysical principle in the sense of being some conditional-like law, or even metaphysically necessary. 
Since valuing attitudes can be contingent and yet serve as connections, then grounds needn’t metaphysically 
necessitate the grounded – in absence of the connections. Some grounds only necessitate the grounded in conjunction with 
connections. In the case of the subjectivist view I defend in this paper, knowledge can ground value for someone given the 
presence of a valuing attitude serving as connection, but won’t ground value for them without such an attitude as 
connection.  
Moreover, whether or not wellbeing connections are principles, I leave it open whether other connections outside 
of the realm of wellbeing might be principles. And I remain neutral as to whether principles or even any further 
connections at all put in place that certain connections underwrite certain grounding facts. Perhaps there is a general 
metaphysical principle of subjectivism that explains why valuing attitudes serve as connections in grounding facts about 
wellbeing. Perhaps, instead, it’s just brute. 
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the list to value. Each of these views about the grounds of value doesn’t settle the connection between 
those grounds and value. Perhaps it’s a brute normative law. Perhaps, as I argue below, it’s something 
about the attitude of the subject.9 
 In what follows, I use the distinction between grounds and connections to separate two 
dimensions to each of the disputes over subjectivism versus objectivism, variabilism versus 
invariabilism, and pluralism versus monism. I develop a view that makes different choices with respect 
to the different axes of dependence. As we’ll see, this view is able to capture the insights contained 
within undifferentiated proposals that fall on opposite sides of the disputes.  
 
 
2. Subjectivism versus Objectivism  
  
In the broadest terms, the dispute between subjectivism and objectivism is over whether value 
depends on minds. As we saw, the most common way to cash this out is in terms of grounding-
dependence. On this construal, subjectivism holds that value is always grounded in a valuing attitude, 
whereas objectivism holds that some grounds of value don’t involve attitudes. Regimented in this way, 
the debate is a useful one to have. But it leaves out a distinct axis of mind-dependence, which is whether 
or not the generation of value depends on valuing attitudes. Once we have the notion of connection-
 
9 At this point, one might worry about the difference between the grounds versus connections distinction and other 
distinctions more familiar in discussions of wellbeing – such as that between the sources versus nature of wellbeing 
(Sumner 1996), as well as that between enumerative versus explanatory theories of wellbeing (Crisp, 2006; Fletcher, 2013; 
Woodard 2013). I discuss the relation between these distinctions in the appendix. 
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dependence, we can ask whether or not the connections linking the grounds of value to value are 
themselves subjective or objective.   
Let’s return to the primordial spring of subjectivism about wellbeing, which is the thought that 
personal value must fit or resonate with the person (Rosati 1996: 299, 2006). It’s expressed nicely in the 
obligatory quote by Peter Railton (2003): 
 
It does seem to me to capture an important feature of the concept of intrinsic value to say that 
what is intrinsically valuable for a person must have a connection with what he would find in 
some degree compelling or attractive, at least if he were rational and aware. It would be an 
intolerably alienated conception of someone’s good to imagine that it might fail in any such 
way to engage him. (47) 
 
There are a variety of ways to spell out this thought.10 But for our purposes it will be enough to note 
that it’s an extremely plausible necessary condition on something being valuable for someone that it 
depends in some way on their valuing it: 
 
 
10 A strong form of resonance is captured by the thesis of judgment internalism (Darwall 1983: 54-55): what a person 
thinks is good for them must in the right circumstances motivate them to seek it out, and what a person thinks is bad for 
them must in the right circumstances motivate them to avoid it. However, many, including myself, are inclined to deny 
such a strong connection in that a person may be weak-willed or lack the relevant information to be motivated by their 
good or bad, and it’s hard to see how to specify the right circumstances in a way that avoids these problems without 
trivializing the thesis as that insofar as one is acting in rational self-interest one will be motivated in accordance with one’s 
self-interested reasons (Korsgaard 1986). One way of trying to circumvent this problem is to appeal to one’s idealized 




Resonance: Necessarily, something being valuable for a person depends in some way on their 
valuing attitudes. 
 
Where this ‘valuing’ is non-instrumental and understood to consist in what the subject ‘really’ values 
– so we do away with valuations based on false beliefs or failures of rationality, and where we might 
need to counterfactually idealize away from the subject’s actual or occurrent attitudes to get at what 
they ‘really’ value.11 
One way to capture resonance is in terms of grounding-dependence. On this understanding, 
resonance leads to subjectivism about the grounds of value: 
 
Grounding Subjectivism: Necessarily, the fact that b is valuable for person s is grounded in 
some fact involving s valuing b.12 
 
Grounding subjectivism holds that, necessarily, something being valuable for a person is grounded in 
a fact involving their valuing it. Grounding objectivism, then, is the denial of grounding subjectivism: 
something can ground value without consisting even partly in a valuing attitude.13  
 
11 For this point, David Sobel (2009) and Dale Dorsey (2017a). 
12 Here and throughout, by ‘valuing’ b I don’t mean that the subject has a thought, necessarily, about b itself. It could be 
that b is an instance of a general feature that the subject values. So one can value a particular case of knowledge by valuing 
knowledge as such. 
 Moreover, I allow that ‘some fact involving s valuing b’ can include elements beyond just the attitude of valuing. 
Thus, it might be some conjunctive fact with non-attitudinal conjuncts and attitudinal conjuncts. 
13 Grounding objectivism leaves open hybrid views where grounds sometimes involve valuing attitudes and other times 
not. An extreme grounding objectivist view would hold that grounds never involve valuing attitudes. 
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As an example of grounding subjectivism, hedonism is a grounding subjectivist view in that 
pleasure is a valuing attitude. And, likewise, desire-satisfactionism is a grounding subjectivist view in 
that something being valuable for someone is grounded in their desiring it and that desire being 
satisfied or thwarted. But objective list theories that include knowledge are grounding objectivist, 
because knowledge can ground value – where knowledge doesn’t consist in a valuing attitude. Thus, 
grounding subjectivism is worthy of the label ‘subjectivist’, and it contrasts with a view worthy of the 
label ‘objectivist’.  
Therefore, grounding subjectivist views capture resonance in that value depends on valuing by 
being grounded in valuing attitudes. Hence, they do better in tying value to valuing than, say, a view 
that holds that it’s simply a brute fact that certain things not involving attitudes – like the preservation 
of nature – make a person’s life go better. However, I think a stronger version of resonance is motivated, 
where views that are merely grounding subjectivist fall afoul of this stronger constraint. This form of 
resonance is motivated by the thought, as Joseph van Weelden (2019: 147) puts it, that “a person can 
confer prudential value upon a given thing by caring about it.” Views that are merely grounding 
subjectivist don’t capture this more extreme form of subjectivism.  
The first way that grounding subjectivism doesn’t capture the full sweep of resonance is that 
even though grounding subjectivism holds that valuing attitudes serve as constituents of wellbeing, it 
still allows that one needn’t value those constituents. Thus, it allows that one can be alienated from 
one’s valuing attitudes in that some of one’s valuing attitudes themselves fail to resonate with oneself. 
We may not care about certain putative grounds of value. Even if these putative grounds involve caring 
attitudes themselves, we may not care about having those caring attitudes or having them satisfied. 
Consider pleasure. Someone may enjoy feeling pleasure, but not particularly value living a life full of 
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pleasure. So while a pleasurable feeling resonates with them in that, well, it’s pleasurable, it still may 
not be the case that pleasure as such resonates with them in the stronger sense as being the sort of thing 
they care to promote in their life. Consider desires. Something that satisfies a desire resonates with a 
person. But the prospect of satisfied desires may not itself resonate with them. They may desire 
something without caring to live the sort of life that has satisfied desires. In this case, it seems wrong 
to think satisfied desires makes their life go better, because desire satisfaction as such doesn’t resonate 
with them. In general, even though a putative ground may resonate with someone, the putative 
grounding fact may not.14  
In this way, grounding subjectivism, by itself, allows that value is not conferred by the subject 
in that they have no say over what grounds value. Given just grounding subjectivism, the subject might 
not have any say over connections, and hence what puts in place the grounding facts of value – even if 
those grounds themselves include their valuing attitudes. Thus, a subjectivism that captures how 
subjects confer value must hold that facts about the grounding of value must themselves resonate with 
a subject. A subject must ‘really’ value the grounds themselves, even if those grounds already involve 
valuing attitudes.  
A subjectivism that admits of this stronger kind resonance would hold that a valuing attitude 
grounds the grounding fact in which value is grounded. We can call this connection subjectivism: 
 
 
14 This is so even for views that make the constituent of wellbeing both the attitude and the object of the attitude. The 
person may not care about this complex state itself. For this point, see van Weelden (2019) and Dorsey (2012a). 
Moreover, compare this to Connie Rosati’s (1996) two-tier internalism. She holds that for subjectivist views that 
appeal to idealized counterparts, the non-idealized person must care about the conditions under which their counterpart is 
idealized. However, presumably Rosati’s view still holds that the grounds of value must include valuing attitudes, just those 




Connection Subjectivism: Necessarily, the fact that b is valuable for person s is grounded in a, 
where the fact that a grounds b being valuable for s is itself grounded in some fact involving s 
valuing a. 
 
Connection subjectivism holds that, necessarily, something gives rise to value for someone only if they 
value it. Connection objectivism, then, is the denial of connection subjectivism: grounding facts of 
value need not even be partially grounded in valuing attitudes.15  
As an example of how connection subjectivism differs from grounding subjectivism, consider 
desire-satisfactionism. As we saw, desire-satisfactionism is grounding subjectivist, but it’s not 
necessarily connection subjectivist. Desire-satisfactionism is compatible with it being a brute 
normative law that a person’s desires being satisfied or thwarted is valuable for them. This would make 
it a connection objectivist view. If so, desire-satisfaction would be true whether or not the person 
themselves cares about having their desires satisfied. At the same time, desire-satisfaction is compatible 
with a connection subjectivist view, whereby satisfied and thwarted desires are valuable because a 
subject cares about their desires. Thus, grounding subjectivism is neutral with respect to connection 
subjectivism, but the stronger form of resonance suggests connection subjectivism. 
The second way that grounding subjectivism fails to capture the full sweep of resonance is that 
grounding subjectivism is false! Many things that don’t inherently involve valuing attitudes can 
resonate with someone. A person may value knowledge, but knowledge doesn’t consist in satisfying 
valuing attitudes. In such cases, it places the explanation in the wrong place to treat the grounds of value 
 
15 Of course, there are hybrid views, where sometimes the connections involve attitudes and other times not. These would 
be connection objectivist in the strict sense, but there are extreme connection objectivist views that hold that attitudes 
never even serve as partial connections for value. 
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as involving valuing attitudes. What is good for them is knowledge – without that consisting in a 
valuing attitude. Why it is good for them – given connection subjectivism – is that they value knowledge 
as making their own life go better. Therefore, while grounding subjectivism certainly achieves some 
rapprochement of value with valuing, it doesn’t do enough and doesn’t do it in the right way. 
We can capture the stronger form of resonance without requiring that the constituents of 
wellbeing necessarily involve valuing attitudes by appealing to connection subjectivism. The best 
subjectivist view, I maintain, is subjectivist about connections but holds that, for at least some subjects, 
some of the grounds of value are objective. This lets us maintain a broadly subjectivist view while 
upholding a form of grounding objectivism. Through a subject’s valuing attitudes they make it so that 
certain items serve as grounds of value. If they value pleasure as the sort of thing that makes their life 
go better, then pleasure serves as a ground for value. If they value knowledge as making their life go 
better, then that makes it so that knowledge generates good for them. Given a particular subject’s 
valuing attitudes as connections, these may well make it so that the grounds of value for them aren’t 
themselves valuing attitudes.  
At this point, let me offer a few words of clarification about what sort of valuing attitudes can 
serve in connections. Officially, connection subjectivism is neutral about the nature of valuing 
attitudes. But, for the sake of specificity, let me sketch what I think is a plausible view. To my mind, 
valuing is not like pleasure or desire in any straightforward sense. Rather, it’s a distinctive mental state 
that orients the person toward the world such that things are presented in a prudentially valuable way. 
Positively valuing, then, is akin to what T.M. Scanlon (1998) calls desire in the “directed-attention 
sense”, in which things are presented in a “favorable light” (39). And valuing as such is what Sharon 
Street (2008) says is the “experience of various things in the world ‘counting in favor of’ or ‘calling for’ 
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or ‘demanding’ certain responses on our part” (240). Personally valuing, then, is an affective state that 
orients one toward the world such that there are good-for-me-seemings and bad-for-me-seemings.16 
Of course, we need some amount of idealization to fix on what the subject ‘really’ values but what we’re 
idealizing is this distinctive orientation toward the world.   
Importantly, this attitude is psychologically basic, unsophisticated, and not conceptually laden. 
Indeed, such states are simple enough to be had by infants and many non-human animals. And they 
certainly don’t require any concepts of ‘personal value’ or ‘grounding’. Ultimately, which beings can 
value in this minimal sense is an empirical question,17 but I think it’s plausible to hold that infants and 
dogs value in this way. They at least, for instance, value comfort and satiation in that they are oriented 
toward these things as good-for-them. Thus, the valuing subject needn’t have any conceptualization of 
the metaphysical role their valuing attitudes play as connections between grounds of value and value.  
Therefore, the connection subjectivist view captures a strong form of subjectivism in that it 
secures the sense in which subjects confer value. However, at the same time it can capture some of the 
motivations for thoroughgoing objectivist views. Primarily, it can capture the sentiment that some 
constituents of wellbeing are objective, non-attitudinal parts of the world. On my account, what is good 
for someone needn’t consist in satisfied desires – or even attitudes at all. Rather, the constituents of 
wellbeing can be completely non-attitudinal affairs like the preservation of nature. Thus, the 
 
16 So, in order to value, I deny that the subject needs to be making judgments in the sense of having a belief (contra Dorsey 
2012b). And I also deny that valuing must be a second-order attitude about an attitude – such as a desire about a desire 
(contra Lewis 1989). While someone may value having certain attitudes, they needn’t only value attitudes. When someone 
values the preservation of nature as making their life go better, they aren’t having an attitude about an attitude, but an 
attitude about preserving nature. Thus, subjects can value without having the reflective capacities to think about their own 
attitudes. 
17 Much animal psychological research into normative thinking pertains to moral as opposed to evaluative cognition, but 
some suggest some other species do have moral practices (see Andrews 2016: sec. 4.5). The sort of simple evaluative 
attitudes I’m envisioning are much less sophisticated than moral ones involved in cooperation and empathy. 
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subjectivist who adopts my view can completely agree with the objectivist about what is valuable for a 
given person. They can completely agree that many of the constituents of a good life don’t involve 
valuing attitudes at all. They just account for why it is valuable in a different way by appealing to 
subjectivism about connections to establish objectivism about grounds. Certainly, this won’t appease 
the objectivist who denies that personal value can be conferred by subjects. But my view at least 
captures the appearances that some substrates of value are non-attitudinal aspects of the world. In this 
respect, it does better than grounding subjectivist views, like hedonism and desire-satisfaction theory, 
that require all grounds of value to involve valuing attitudes. 
Moreover, my view has the resources to directly undermine some arguments for objectivism, 
namely some of those that don’t appeal to intuitions about a mind-independent realm of value. Eden 
Lin (2017a) has offered one such argument in the form of a dilemma. Either subjectivists hold that the 
grounds of personal value vary between different sorts of subjects or they don’t. In the first case, Lin 
argues that subjectivists have no good explanation for this. In the second, he argues that they generate 
implausible verdicts about welfare subjects who lack complex valuing attitudes. For subjects like infants 
and dogs, Lin argues, the subjectivist must either hold that they do not have wellbeing or that a subject’s 
wellbeing can be radically changed simply by coming to acquire sophisticated valuing attitudes. 
Neither, according to Lin, is palatable.18  
To see how the subjectivist can respond to this argument, we must first get clearer on the 
background debate between variabilism and invariabilism that’s at play in this argument. Once we do, 
we’ll see that the connection-dependent subjectivist has resources to grab the dilemma by the horns. 
 
18 Though see Dorsey (2017b) for the claim that the second horn is in fact palatable. He holds that we can explain why 
subjects come to have radically different levels of wellbeing due to changes in attitudes. As I discuss below, part of my 





3. Variabilism versus Invariabilism 
 
Variabilism holds that the nature of wellbeing can differ across subjects, whereas 
invariabilism denies this (Lin 2018). Variabilism denies that the nature of wellbeing is universal in that 
different sorts of value ‘fit’ different sorts of subjects, while invariabilism upholds universality in trying 
to capture that there’s something common to value for all subjects.19 Yet, given the distinction between 
grounding and connecting, we can distinguish two disputes over whether wellbeing varies across 
subjects. Ultimately, we can use this distinction to capture an invariant account of how value can ‘fit’ 
particular subjects. But to build up to this, let’s first consider the most sustained argument against 
variabilism.  
Abstracting away from particular substantive theories of value, Lin offers two arguments for 
invariabilism. The first is that of simplicity (2018: 324). All else equal, we should prefer simpler and 
more unified theories, and invariabilism is a simpler and more unified theory. The second argument is 
that there is no good explanation for why variabilism would be true, which Lin defends by rejecting 
several candidate explanations (2018: sec. 2). However, appealing to the distinction between grounds 
 
19 While this debate is a newcomer to the value theory scene, it’s a cousin of more traditional debates in moral theory 
concerned with the universality of moral principles. Thus, many Kantians famously hold that the Categorical Imperative 
applies to all agents, and many welfarist utilitarians claim that maximizing the welfare of all subjects is the singular moral 
aim. These are ‘invariabilist’ positions about moral principles, while the view that Robert Nozick (1974) labels 
“utilitarianism for animals, Kantianism for people” (39) is a ‘variabilist’ view of moral norms. Seen in this light, the debate 
over variabilism and invariabilism about wellbeing is over the ‘universality’ of the structure of personal value.  
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and connections allows us to offer a simple and explanatory theory that is invariabilist along one 
dimension but variabilist along another.20  
As for the variabilist aspect, recall that the connection subjectivist view I’ve been developing 
holds that a subject’s valuations set up grounding facts of the form: a grounds b being valuable for s. 
These valuations, then, create the candidate goods for a subject. Yet, different subjects value differently, 
creating different candidate goods for a subject. In fact, certain subjects are not able to value certain 
things that others can. A table can’t value anything, but Fluffy can value their hunger being sated. Fluffy 
can’t value free jazz aesthetic activity, but Ornette Coleman can. Insofar as it is impossible for a subject 
to value a, then a fortiori they don’t value a. But given the variation in the nature of subjects, a different 
subject might be able to value a, and they might in fact value it. Given connection subjectivism, this 
means that for certain subjects, a makes b valuable for them, but for others it doesn’t. Thus, given this 
sort of subjectivism, there is what we can call grounding variabilism: 
 
Grounding Variabilism: Possibly, for some subjects s and s', there are an a and b such that a 
grounds b being valuable for s but it’s not the case that a grounds b being valuable for s'. 
 
Given connection subjectivism, a grounds b being valuable for s only if s values a. It might be that some 
subject s' cannot or does not value a. Thus, different subjects have different sorts of grounds of value. 
As for the invariabilist aspect, the connection subjectivist view I’ve developed holds that there 
is just one sort of connection. There is just one sort of ground of grounding facts of value – namely, that 
 




the subject ‘really’ prudentially values something. While this sort of valuing can apply to a range of 
different objects, it is one and the same attitude at the relevant generality for normative theorizing. 
There is a unified attitude of valuing – despite vagaries of the realization of valuing across different 
instances of the attitude. In this way, the view entails what we can call connection invariabilism. 
Roughly, this holds that if something serves as a connection for the grounding of value for one subject, 
then that same sort of thing serves as a connection for the grounding of value for another. To state this 
a bit more carefully: 
 
Connection Invariabilism: Necessarily, for all subjects s and s', if a connection c grounds the 
fact that a grounds b being valuable for s, where a and c may involve s, then c' grounds the fact 
that a' grounds b being valuable for s', where a' and c' are just like a and c except any involvement 
of s is replaced with s'. 
 
Given connection invariabilism, connection subjectivism offers a simple and unified explanation of 
grounding variabilism. Different subjects are able to value differently. These different valuations set up 
different grounding facts with different possible grounds of value for different subjects. But the way 
those valuations set up the grounding facts is the same for all subjects: valuation creates value.21 
This view lets us respond to Lin’s argument against subjectivism. To remind you, the argument 
was that either subjectivists need to be variabilists or they need to make implausible claims about the 
 
21 This view differs from Dale Dorsey’s (2017b) variabilist view that personal value is given by ‘kinship relations’ that 
ensure that the valuable thing ‘fits’ the person. For valuing subjects, Dorsey holds that such kinship relations are selected 
by what they value, but holds that for non-valuing subjects – among which he includes infants – the kinship relations are 
different. But then it’s mysterious what selects the relation in the case of non-valuing subjects, and also what explains why 
the selection process is different for different subjects. 
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welfare of certain subjects of wellbeing. Lin argues against the first horn, because he thinks there is no 
simple and explanatory account of variabilism. He argues against the second, because he thinks it’s 
implausible that subjects like infants and dogs either don’t have wellbeing after all or that their 
wellbeing can radically change as soon as they come to have more complicated valuing attitudes that 
fail to be satisfied.  
My view grabs both horns of the dilemma. As for the first, it offers an explanation for 
variabilism about grounds via a simple and unified invariabilism about connections. As for the second, 
the view holds that infants and dogs have wellbeing insofar as they have valuing attitudes. Recall, the 
view as I’ve developed it holds that the relevant sort of valuing is so minimal that it’s plausible that 
these simple subjects value. Thus, it also makes sense that in coming to have more complicated 
valuations a subject’s wellbeing can radically change, because they become more vulnerable to the state 
of the world. When what’s good for someone transitions from simply being warmed and nourished to 
wanting to know or achieve or love, then there are more ways to be harmed – but also more ways to be 
benefitted (Dorsey 2017b).  
To be clear, this increase in complexity of valuations is compatible with connection 
invariabilism. As I see it, increase in complexity doesn’t involve a fundamental change in what serves 
as connection for grounding value: it’s always the same sort of valuing attitude. Indeed, as I discussed 
earlier, on my view all valuing consists in a distinctive normative orientation toward the world. 
Therefore, the complexity comes in the content of what’s valued, not the attitude itself. Compare: one 
can have the belief that grass is green, and one can believe in the theory of general relativity – but they’re 
both beliefs. If there were fundamentally distinct sorts of valuing attitudes across – or even within! – 
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subjects, then connection variabilism would be true. But I think there is a unity across all valuing such 
that this common sort of valuing activity serves in connections for all value. 
 
 
4. Pluralism versus Monism 
 
As they are usually portrayed, pluralism holds that there are a variety of different sorts of goods 
and bads, whereas monism holds that there is just one. Hedonism is a paradigmatically monist view in 
that it holds pleasure is the only good and pain the only bad. Desire-satisfactionism is a monist view as 
well, because it claims that the only good is having one’s desires satisfied and the only bad is having 
them thwarted. Objective list theories that allow for a variety of basic goods and bads – such as both 
pleasure and desire-satisfaction, or friendship, or knowledge, or whatever – are paradigmatically 
pluralist theories.  
This way of framing the dispute between pluralism and monism makes it turn on the grounds 
of value. It’s a dispute over the number of different possible sorts of grounds of value for subjects. 
However, once we distinguish grounding from connecting, we’ll see that a view can be pluralist or 
monist along the connection axis as well. We’ll also see that whether a view is connection pluralist or 
monist doesn’t entail one way or the other whether it’s grounding pluralist or monist. As I’ve developed 
the connection subjectivist view, however, it’s pluralist about grounds but monist about connections. 
This lets it simultaneously satisfy motivations for monism as well as pluralism. 
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Before proceeding, let me offer some important clarifications. We need to be careful in 
interpreting pluralism and monism, given the separate issue of variabilism versus invariabilism. 
Speaking roughly, if variabilism were true, it might be that pluralism is true for some subjects and 
monism is true for others. The strong form of monism comes packaged with invariabilism, so that for 
all subjects monism holds. The weak form of pluralism comes packaged with variabilism, so that for at 
least some subjects pluralism holds. The arguments for monism naturally suggest the strong form, 
whereas the arguments for pluralism only suggest the weak. So take those to be the relevant views in 
what follows. 
Aside from commitment to a particular substantive theory of wellbeing, the most common sort 
of argument for monism comes from theoretical considerations. In this vein, Ben Bradley (2009) argues 
for monism on the basis of theoretical simplicity: 
 
Simplicity is a very desirable feature of a theory… Pluralists will say there are many other things 
that are good for people besides pleasure… I disagree. Sometimes we need to learn to live with 
the apparently counterintuitive implications of our philosophical theories when the alternative 
is to accept a convoluted monstrosity. (xx) 
 
He then goes on to argue for monism on the basis of theoretical unity: 
 
Pluralism seems objectionably arbitrary. Whatever the composition of the list, we can always 
ask: why should these things be on the list? What do they have in common? What is the rational 
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principle that yields the result that these things, and no others, are the things that are good? 
(16) 
 
In terms of grounding, Bradley argues that monism is a simpler and more unified theory in that it 
posits just one sort of ground of value, whereas pluralism is objectionably complicated and ad hoc by 
positing a whole list of grounds.  
By contrast to these considerations of theoretical virtue, perhaps the strongest argument for 
pluralism is that, unlike monism, it accommodates the appearances. A variety of different sorts of 
things seem good and bad for people – and other sentient beings as well (Lin 2014). If so, then pluralism 
allows this by holding that there a variety of different grounds of value. 
As framed so far, the debate over pluralism and monism turns on grounding. Monism is 
supposed to be theoretically more appealing theory in positing one sort of ground of value, while 
pluralism is supposed to be a more accurate theory by positing a variety of them. We can therefore 
more accurately label this dispute as between grounding pluralism versus grounding monism. 
However, once we distinguish grounding from connecting, we see that there is in addition connection 
pluralism versus connection monism. Connection pluralism holds that – at least for some subjects – 
different sorts of connections can ground grounding facts of value, while connection monism requires 
that – for all subjects – there is just one sort of connection for value.  
Appealing to the distinction between grounding and connecting, we can simultaneously satisfy 
motivations for monism and pluralism. We simply hold for at least some subjects grounding pluralism 
is true, but for all subjects connection-dependence monism is true. For all subjects, there is just one 
sort of connection for creating grounds of value, but for a particular subject this sort of connection can 
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create a variety of different grounds for value. This view is theoretically simple and unified in that it 
posits a single sort of connection. But it also accommodates the appearances in that it allows for variety 
of different grounds of value. Thus, we have a weak form of grounding pluralism, with a strong form 
of connection monism. 
The particular connection subjectivism I’ve been defending has exactly this structure. It’s 
connection monist, because for each subject their valuing creates the grounding facts of value. Yet, for 
subjects with diverse valuations, they have a variety of grounds of value. A person might value pleasure, 
but they might also value knowledge. For this person, grounding pluralism is true. However, for 
subjects with homogenous valuations, they might have just one ground of good and one ground of bad 
– such as, perhaps, a late-stage fetus who is only attracted to comfort and only averse to discomfort. 
For this sort of subject, grounding monism would be true.  
However, one might worry that connection-dependence monism is incompatible with 
grounding-dependence variabilism.22 Yet, this is not so. A single form of valuing can give rise to a 
plurality of different grounds, and different people can value different things – even if the form of 
valuing is the same. Thus, someone may value solely pleasure, and another may value pleasure as well 
as friendship. The contents are different but there is no need to think the nature of their valuing 
attitudes are different – hence connection invariabilism is true. Despite the vagaries of psychology there 
is a unified valuing attitude at the relevant level of generality – hence connection monism is true. Yet, 
this same attitude can apply to different things for different people, as well as different things for one 
and the same person. Grounding-dependence monism is true for the first person, while grounding-
 
22 I thank an anonymous reviewer for raising this concern. 
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dependence pluralism is true for the second. Hence, grounding-dependence variabilism is true, despite 
connection-dependence monism and invariabilism. 
This view can accommodate the data at least as well as traditional grounding pluralist views. A 
variety of different things are valuable, and, indeed, for different subjects different things are valuable. 
Yet at the same time, the connection monism aspect of the view is theoretically simple and unified, 
which is a feature that motivates grounding monism. Despite a variety of different sorts of valuable 
things for different sorts of subjects, these are all explained by the same metaphysical structure. There 
is a single sort of connection flowing from valuing that can explain the diversity of valuable sorts of 
things. 
Given the distinction between grounding and connecting, I’ve developed and defended a view 
of wellbeing that makes distinct choices with respect to these distinct axes of dependence. The view is 
subjectivist about connections but objectivist about grounds. It thereby allows wellbeing to resonate in 
a deeper way than those that are solely subjectivist. Yet at the same time, it can capture the insight of 
objectivism that grounds themselves needn’t resonate with the subject. The view is also invariabilist 
about connections but variabilist about grounds. Hence, we have a simple and unified explanation for 
why different sorts of things are valuable for different subjects. Finally, the view is monist about 
connections but pluralist about grounds. So we have an elegant explanation for why different sorts of 
things can be valuable for one and the same subject. By distinguishing grounding from connecting, we 
can distill the same metaphysical structure throughout the complexity of wellbeing.  
 
 




I argued for the importance of distinguishing between grounds and connections when it comes 
to separating distinct dimensions of subjectivism versus objectivism, variabilism versus invariabilism, 
and pluralism versus monism. Yet one might worry that the distinction between grounds and 
connections appears to be similar to other distinctions that are more familiar in discussions of 
wellbeing. In particular, one might worry about the extent of the difference between the grounds versus 
connections distinction and, first, the sources versus nature of wellbeing distinction and, second, the 
enumerative versus explanatory theories distinction. Therefore, in this final section, I want to show 
how distinguishing grounding versus connecting takes us beyond these other distinctions.23  
As for the sources versus nature distinction, Sumner (1996) tells us that the sources of wellbeing 
are the “particular things capable of being beneficial,” while the nature of wellbeing is given by “the 
conditions which constitute someone’s being benefitted by something” (16).  Sumner requires, as part 
of a ‘formality’ constraint, that a theory of welfare must hold that “however plural welfare is at the level 
of its sources…it is unitary at the level of nature…which applies equally to all the different varieties of 
welfare, all of its sources, and all of its many subjects” (17). Thus, it might seem like my view and 
Sumner’s views provide similar taxonomical resources, with sources corresponding to grounds and 
nature corresponding to connections. 
In fact, it might seem like our views even coincide substantively. As part of his substantive view, 
Sumner upholds a broad subjectivism. He claims that authentic happiness about something makes it a 
source of wellbeing. (1996: ch. 6). Authentic happiness involves an “experience requirement” (138) 
 
23 I thank an anonymous reviewer for posing the concern about the difference from the distinction between sources versus 
nature, and I also thank them as well as another reviewer for posing the concern about the difference from the distinction 
between enumerative versus explanatory theories. 
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such that “a condition of someone’s life counts as an intrinsic source of well-being for her just in case 
she authentically endorses it, or finds it satisfying, for its own sake,” (180) where endorsement and 
satisfaction involve experiencing it (sec. 6.1). Because of the variety of people’s experiential sentiments, 
someone can derive happiness from multiple things and different things can make different people 
happy. Sumner, then, is subjectivist about the nature of wellbeing, pluralist about the sources, and 
invariabilist about the nature while variabilist about the sources.24 Thus, it might seem like our views 
are substantively similar as well. 
However, while Sumner’s view is clearly a precursor to my own, the views are importantly 
different in both substantive and taxonomical respects. The biggest substantive difference is that I reject 
the experience requirement. On my view, a valuing attitude can make it such that an unexperienced 
item is a constituent of wellbeing. Our conceptual taxonomies are importantly different as well. As part 
of his ‘formality’ constraint, Sumner explicitly requires that the nature of wellbeing – the set of 
conditions which constitute welfare – is unitary and applies equally to all subjects. In my idiom, this is 
to require that a proper theory of wellbeing must be monist and invariabilist about connections. Thus, 
his taxonomy bans pluralist as well as variabilist connections by fiat, which makes the sources versus 
nature distinction unable to articulate a wide swath of views about wellbeing. For example, it cannot 
capture the Robust Hybrid view of Steven Wall and David Sobel (forthcoming), which holds that 
certain things are objectively good for someone while for other things subjective attitudes can make 
them valuable. By contrast, my framework can capture this in terms of pluralism about connections. 
As another example, Sumner’s taxonomy cannot accommodate Dale Dorsey’s (2017b) view that 
welfare requires a relation of ‘fit’ that is significantly different for valuing and non-valuing creatures. 
 
24 I thank an anonymous reviewer for asking how my view differs than Sumner’s in its substantive elements. 
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Yet my framework can capture this in terms of variabilism about connections. While my substantive 
view, like Sumner’s, is monist and invariabilist about connections, I defend this on substantive grounds, 
not by decree. The substantive view I defend is just one within the larger taxonomy disclosed by the 
distinction between grounds and connections. Half the point of this paper is to offer that taxonomy. 
As for enumeration versus explanation, Roger Crisp – and those who follow him (Fletcher 
2013: 206; Woodard 2013: 790-792) – hold that enumerative theories list the things that are valuable 
for you, while explanatory theories explain why they are valuable for you. Since most substantive 
theories of wellbeing offer a mixture of enumeration and explanation (Lin 2017b), it’s best not to invoke 
a distinction among theories themselves but instead among different aspects of the structure of 
wellbeing. In this light, Crisp (2006) holds that enumeration lists the “substantive goods” that “make 
someone’s life go better for them”, while explanation provides the “good-for-making” properties 
possessed by all the constituents of wellbeing (102). In a related vein, Guy Fletcher (2013) distinguishes 
between “which things enhance wellbeing” and “why something enhances well-being” (206), and he 
goes on to offer as his paradigm explanatory claim David Sobel’s (2009: 337) subjectivist formulation 
that “something is good for a person…because she has a desire of the right sort for it” (207). And as 
Christopher Woodard (2013) formulates the distinction, it is between answers to the question “what 
are the constituents of (some subject’s) welfare?” and the question “in virtue of what is any given item 
supposed to be a constituent of (some subject’s) welfare” (790-791)? 
 Certainly, then, the distinction between grounds versus connections is in the same spirit as that 
between enumeration and explanation. However, I deny that thereby nothing new is gained. First, the 
distinction between grounds and connections is enfolded within a rich theory of grounding, and the 
precise distinction between grounds and connections allows for a clearer taxonomy and formulation 
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of views. Hence, I take the grounds versus connections distinction as an important development of the 
enumeration versus explanation distinction. Second, proponents of the enumerative versus 
explanatory distinction have mostly focused on the issue of subjectivism versus objectivism (Fletcher 
2013: sec. 2; Woodard 2013: 797-802). They have not differentiated in detail the distinct dimensions of 
pluralism versus monism, or variabilism versus invariabilism along the grounding and connecting 
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